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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jose Guadalupe Perez-Jungo entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of
possession of methamphetamine, preserving his right to challenge the district court's
order denying his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Perez-Jungo asserts that the district court
erred in denying his Motion to Suppress because his prolonged detention and the
subsequent search of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The State presents three main points in its Respondent's Brief. First, the State
argues that Mr. Perez-Jungo waived his ability to challenge the district court's finding
that an altemative basis for the initial detention was a parking violation. This argument
is irrelevant because Mr. Perez-Jungo is not challenging the initial detention on appeal
and, since there is no evidence in the record that Trooper Marquez ever intended to
investigate or write a ticket for a parking violation, the State cannot use the potential
parking violation as a justification for Trooper Marquez to continue the detention.
Second, the State argues that the detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo was not
prolonged because Trooper Marquez had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Perez-Jungo
was driving under the influence or was involved in "drug-related activities."

This

argument fails because the facts cited by the State do not support reasonable suspicion
for either a DUI or drug trafficking.
Finally, the State argues that it is false and irrelevant to conclude that Trooper
Marquez prolonged the detention by not investigating a DUI.

Mr. Perez-Jungo's

assertion that Trooper Marquez did not conduct a DUI investigation is clear from the
facts and police officers are required to use the least intrusive means to verify or dispel
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their suspicions. Here, the least intrusive means to dispel a suspicion for DUI would
been to conduct some form of field sobriety tests, which Trooper Marquez did not.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Perez-Jungo's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief,
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress because his
detention was unduly prolonged and, therefore, the subsequent search of his person
and vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion To Suppress

A.

Mr. Perez-Jungo Is Not Challenging The Initial Detention
The State has asserted that the initial detention by Trooper Marquez was justified

by a possible parking violation and that this Court must affirm the district court's
determination that the initial detention was justified.

(Respondent's Brief, pA.)

Mr. Perez-Jungo is not challenging the initial detention on appeal. Trooper Marquez
created a de facto detention when he pulled up behind Mr. Perez-Jungo's truck and
activated his emergency lights. (Tr.,

15, Ls.2-7.) However, given the circumstances,

the initial detention was justified by Trooper Marquez's community caretaker function
and is, therefore, not being challenged.
The State argued at the suppression hearing that Trooper Marquez also had
reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-659(1),
which states:
Outside a business or residential district no person shall stop, park or
leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the
roadway when it is practicable to stop, park or so leave the vehicle off the
roadway [ ... ]
Whether or not a violation of Idaho Code § 49-659(1) justified Mr. Perez-Jungo's
initial detention is not relevant to the issue presented on appeal, which concerns a
prolonged detention. Since the State, at the suppression hearing, did not present any

evidence that Trooper Marquez was intending to give a warning or write a citation for a
parking violation, the State cannot use the potential parking violation as a justification
for prolonging the detention.
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B.

Trooper Marquez Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Continue To Detain
Mr. Perez-Jungo
The State has asserted that Trooper Marquez did not prolong the detention

because he had reasonable suspicion that a DUI or drug trafficking was occurring.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-8.)

The State appears to be conflating the reasonable

suspicion required for a DUI investigation and the reasonable suspicion required for a
drug trafficking investigation. It is not enough for an officer to present a hodgepodge of
facts that seem unusual and may indicate a crime, but not establish enough facts to
support suspicion of a particular crime.
Further, contrary to the State's assertion, Mr. Perez-Jungo is not asking,
"blatantly" or otherwise, for this Court to ignore the totality of the circumstances test.
(Respondent's Brief, p.7) The contra authority cited in Appellant's Brief on page 14,
State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 316 (2001), illustrates a factual example where

suspects' stories were internally inconsistent, i.e. the co-travelers told officers conflicting
stories about their destination and the purpose of their trip. Here, while acknowledging
that Trooper Marquez was not required to accept his explanation, Mr. Perez-Jungo
explained that he was parked on the side of the road to talk to someone about a job.
(Tr., p.23, Ls.11-15.) While Trooper Marquez is entitled to his suspicions, the only point
Mr. Perez-Jungo was making was that, unlike the facts in the cited contra authority, his
explanation was internally consistent, which is one factor for the Court to consider in its
totality of the circumstances analysis.
Trooper Marquez stated at the suppression motion hearing that he suspected
DUI or drug trafficking, although his explanation at the scene to other officers was
simply that "obviously something was not right," without ever mentioning a DUI or drug
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trafficking.

(Tr., p.4?, Ls.15-19).

Mr. Perez-Jungo is not asking the court to ignore

evidence.

He is asserting that, even considering the evidence cited by Trooper

Marquez, there was no particularized reasonable suspicion of DUI or drug trafficking.
While there may have been circumstances that Trooper Marquez found unusual or
"obviously not right," this is not the standard for reasonable suspicion. This argument
was presented in detail in Appellant's Brief, and need not be repeated here.
Finally, the State claims that Mr. Perez-Jungo did not object to the consideration
of the Santa Muerte statute in the district court and, therefore, cannot discuss it now.
(Respondent's Brief, p.?) This argument fails because the district court determined that
the presence of the Santa Muerte statute factored into its reasonable suspicion
analysis. Because it was a basis for the district court's decision, it is an appropriate
topic on appeal.

C.

Even If Trooper Marquez Had Reasonable Suspicion To Support A Detention For
A DUI Investigation, The Detention Was Prolonged Because Trooper Marquez
Did Not Use The Least Intrusive Means To Verify Or Dispel His Suspicion
The State asserts that Trooper Marquez did, in fact, investigate Mr. Perez-Jungo

for a DUI, and, whether or not Trooper Marquez investigated a DUI is irrelevant.
(Respondent's Brief, p.8.)

The State appears to misunderstand Mr. Perez-Jungo's

argument regarding Trooper Marquez's failure to investigate a DUI. Mr. Perez-Jungo
acknowledges that reasonable suspicion is an objective standard. However, whether or
not an officer uses the least intrusive means available to him speaks directly to the
issue of whether a detention is prolonged. Since Trooper Marquez identified DUI as the
crime for which he had reasonable suspicion, whether or not he investigated this
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possible offense is highly relevant to the question of whether the detention was
prolonged.
As a preliminary matter, the State asserts that Mr. Perez-Jungo did not preserve
below the argument that "Trooper Marquez failed to investigate him [Mr. Perez-Jungo]
for DUI."

(Respondent's Brief, p.9.)

Since the State does not cite any case law

supporting this argument, it is unclear exactly what the State is asserting. Mr. PerezJungo filed a motion to suppress that challenged the length of the detention. At the
hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel specifically questioned Trooper
Marquez about what steps he took, or did not take, to investigate Mr. Perez-Jungo for a
DUI. (Tr., p.44, Ls.5-21.) The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized that errors
preserved by motion or appear are reviewable on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 224 (2010).

The conclusion that Trooper Marquez failed to investigate

Mr. Perez-Jungo for a DUI is a proper deduction from the facts on the record, and it is
not a separate legal argument that requires preservation.

Further, the district court

stated in its decision that Trooper Marquez had reasonable suspicion to justify
prolonging the detention because Trooper Marquez was investigating Mr. Perez Jungo
for a DUI. (R., p.135.) The fact that no such investigation occurred is a fact that directly
refutes a basis for the court's decision.
Further, the State claims that the record does not show that Trooper Marquez
abandoned his DUI investigation.

(Respondent's Brief, p.1 0.)

However, the record

shows that Trooper Marquez never started a DUI investigation in the first place. When
investigating a suspect for DUI, field sobriety tests are the least intrusive means of
investigation.

State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 482 (Ct. App. 1999).
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Rather than

conduct these tests, Trooper Marquez returned to his patrol car where he called for a
drug dog and waited in his car for the dog to arrive. During this time, Trooper Marquez
could have conducted field sobriety tests or taken other steps that would be relevant to
a DUI investigation. It is clear that Trooper Marquez was conducting a drug trafficking
investigation, for which he did not have reasonable suspicion.
The State further claims that the assertion that Trooper Marquez had to actually
investigate the crime for which he claimed to have detained Mr. Perez-Jungo is "without
basis in law or fact, especially in the absence of any evidence that Trooper Marquez
was an expert in field sobriety testing to detect marijuana intoxication." (Respondent's
Brief, p.11.) First, as made clear in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983), an
investigative detention must last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop. Unless there was also an independent basis for Trooper Marquez to suspect
drug activity, which Mr. Perez--Jungo maintains there was not, sitting in his patrol car for
ten minutes to wait for a drug dog to arrive is not relevant to a DUI investigation and,
therefore, Trooper Marquez improperly prolonged the detention. Second, the State's
assertion that Trooper Marquez could not conduct an investigation because there was
no evidence that he was an expert in field sobriety testing to detect marijuana
intoxication is absurd.

(Respondent's Brief, p.11.) Clearly, a patrol officer does not

need to be an expert to conduct DUI testing, as it is a standard part of every officer's
training.

And, if there was a reason that Trooper Marquez could not conduct the

investigation himself, it is the State's burden to show that the detention was reasonable
because Trooper Marquez was unqualified and, therefore, had to wait for another
officer.
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Finally, the State asserts that "whether the police abandoned the DUI
investigation to pursue a drug investigation is constitutionally irrelevant." (Respondent's
Brief, p.g.)

This would be a true statement if Trooper Marquez had reasonable

suspicion to support a drug trafficking investigation. However, the facts do not support
reasonable suspicion for either a DUI or a drug trafficking investigation and, therefore,
Trooper Marquez prolonged his detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Perez-Jungo respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment and
commitment, reverse the order denying his Motion to Suppress, and remand the case to
the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 26 th day of March, 2014.

E. SMITH
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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